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INTRODUCTION

On the pages of this law review, in an article entitled Uncertainty and

Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, the authors argued for the recogni
tion of a new product liability cause of action when drug companies fail to
warn about uncertain risks attendant to the use of non-therapeutic drugs
1
whose purpose is to enhance lifestyle. We noted that in the post D aubert
-

era, plaintiffs have faced increasing difficulty in proving that a given toxic
agent was causally responsible for the injuries suffered after ingesting a
2
drug. That plaintiffs cannot overcome the barriers to proving injury causa
tion does not mean that defendants have met their obligation to warn about
the dangers associated with taking the drug. In many instances it is clear that
drug companies failed to warn about known dangers or negligently failed to
3
adequately test drugs for dangerous side effects. Even if plaintiffs cannot
meet the high burden of proving injury-causation, we contend that plaintiffs

*
Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1 9 53, Rad
cliffe; J.D. 1 9 56, Columbia.
**
Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B. 1 9 62, Beth Medrash Elyon Re
search Institute; B.S. 1 9 70, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee; J.D. 1 9 6 5 , Marquette.

1. Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncenainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking
Daubert, 104 M1cH. L. REV. 257 (2005).
2.

Id. at 260- 267.

3.

Id. at 267-270.
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should be able to establish a cause of action for the failure of drug compa
nies to provide the requisite information so that plaintiffs could make
informed choices as to whether they wanted to expose themselves to the
4

uncertain risk associated with the drug.

We acknowledge that when plaintiffs cannot establish injury-causation,
5
recovery for physical harm is inappropriate. However, a plaintiff deprived
of informed choice has a legitimate claim for mental distress resulting from
6
having lost the opportunity to refuse to subject herself to uncertain risk. In
our article we set forth the template for this causation-free cause of action
7
for the deprivation of choice.
In a sharply worded rebuttal, Professor David Bernstein takes issue with
8
9
our thesis. He considers our proposal to be "ill-conceived and dangerous."
Bernstein argues that Bendectin, the drug we use to exemplify the need for a
1
causation-free informed choice cause of action, has proven to be safe. 0
From 1957 to 1983 Bendectin was a popular drug taken by women in the
11
first trimester of pregnancy to reduce symptoms of nausea. Though at first
there was reason to believe that it might cause birth defects, two decades
12
Merrell-Dow, the manufacturer of

later, research has proven its safety.

Bendectin, withdrew the drug from the market because of the onslaught of
litigation brought by parents who claimed that the drug was responsible for
13
Bernstein bemoans the withdrawal of

children born with limb reduction.

this useful drug from the market because of a bogus scare created by avari
14
cious plaintiff's lawyers. Bernstein argues that our proposal would deliver
a new cause of action to an irresponsible plaintiff's bar based on a vague
standard as to what qualifies to be a "material risk" deserving of an in
15
formed choice warning. Absent Daubert screening for reliability, Bernstein
argues, juries will fall prey to plaintiffs' attorneys who are "masters at ap
16
pealing to juries' emotions." Furthermore, he claims that informed choice
drug litigation will deter doctors from prescribing safe drugs and patients

4.

Id. at 270-275 .

5 . The authors d o not challenge the received wisdom that a plaintiff must establish a causal
nexus between the defendant's defective product and the physical harm suffered. Id. at 268.
6.

Id. at 280-281.

7.

Id. at 282-288.

8. David E. Bernstein, Leaming the Wrong Lessons from " An American Tragedy": A Cri
tique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961 (2006).
9.

Id. at 1962.

10.

Id. at 1963-67.

11.

MICHAEL

D.

GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: T HE CHALLENGES OF MASS

TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION

91, 180 (1996).

12.

Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1965-66.

13.

GREEN, supra

note 11, at 180.

14.

Bernstein, supra note 8, at 196 5 .

15.

Id. a t 1969-70.

16.

Id. at 1975 .
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17
from taking them even when necessary. And if all this were not enough,
adding this new drug cause of action will burden the scientific community
18
with endless discovery requests that amount to harassment. Bernstein con
cludes that our regime will deter innovation and ultimately result in a surfeit
.
19
of useless wammgs.
I. FROM THE WRONG END OF THE TELESCOPE
A. A Different Perspective on Bendectin
Well over half of Professor Bernstein ' s rebuttal concerns Bendectin. De
spite his suggestions to the contrary, we do not dispute his conclusion that
by the 1980s Bendectin was shown not to pose actionable harm to the chil
dren of women who had taken the morning-sickness remedy. His discussion
and conclusion are, however, totally irrelevant to our thesis. For us, the sig
nificant date is not the moment when a scientific consensus was reached that
Bendectin was, at most, a mild teratogen with undetectable effects. For us
the significant date is 1974, when Betty Mekdeci took Bendectin to counter
20
the nausea she experienced while pregnant with her son David. Professor
Bernstein does concede, albeit in footnotes, that "[t]o the extent that physi
cians reportedly told patients that Bendectin was proven 'totally safe' before
21
the 1980s, this information was inaccurate."
In text, Professor Bernstein tries to move the significant date back to
22
1977-the year Mekdeci instituted suit -a date that is equally irrelevant to
our hypothesis that plaintiff is entitled to a meaningful informed choice be
fore taking a lifestyle drug. Professor Bernstein argues that fourteen
epidemiological studies had been performed by 1977 finding no association
and that "no serious doubts" had been raised about "[Bendectin's] safety in
23
the scientific or medical community." This statement is somewhat disin
genuous. We are most fortunate that two excellent books exist about the
Bendectin litigation written by two eminent law professors, Michael Green
24
and Joseph Sanders. Both books document that there were "signals" point
ing to possible adverse outcomes and that there was no basis in 1974 for
concluding that the drug was safe.

17.

ld. atl976--77.

18.

Id. at 1977.

19.

Id. at 1978-79.

20.

GREEN, supra note 11, at

21.

Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1964 n.8; see also id. at 1968 n.50.

22.

See id. at 1963; text accompanying notes 4 and 5 .

23.

Id.

24.

GREEN, supra

LITIGATION

(1998).

l.

note 11; JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TruAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
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Professor Sanders could find no indication that any research had been
25
He found nine

conducted on Bendectin before it was marketed in 1956.

epidemiological studies that were conducted prior to 1974, and although
none found an association between Bendectin and birth defects, Professor
Sanders critiques them as having little scientific value-most contained no
statistical analyses, failed to focus on Bendectin, and had a limited ability to
26
detect small defects. One of the studies was done so badly that plaintiffs
later used it to show "Merrell's lack of concern about the safety of the
,,21
drug.
And there were adverse signals. Physicians sent adverse reaction reports
to Merrell and then were pressured by Merrell to reclassify them as inquiries
so that they did not have to be reported to the FDA (Food and Drug Admini
28
stration). A 1963 unfavorable animal study by a Merrell employee was not
submitted to the FDA for three years, and then only after the data were
modified and the author's recommendations for further studies were de
29
leted. But no research was done by Merrell. According to Professor
Sanders, "[a]t the end of 1984 one would have concluded that the in vivo
30
research cast doubt on the safety of Bendectin." Professor Green 's conclu
sion is equally telling: "[t]he five juries that awarded punitive damages
against Merrell did not concoct out of thin air their findings of recklessness
31
or wanton disregard, required for awarding punitive damages."
It doesn't matter to Professor Bernstein that in 1974 Merrell had no ba
sis for opining that its drug was safe. The results he fears from our
suggested cause of action are so horrendous that he is willing to impose on
the plaintiff all the uncertainty about the safety of the drug and all the costs
and burdens of jumping through the Daubert trilogy hoops. He fails to ac
knowledge that many of the horrors that he foresees would not occur if
pharmaceutical companies would advise physicians about possible risks
associated with lifestyle drugs so that they can counsel their patients appro
priately. If Mrs. Mekdeci and other pregnant women had elected not to take
Bendectin, the results Professor Bernstein envisions would not materialize.
Of course, if women refuse to take the drug in question, the pharmaceutical
company may end up without a marketable drug as happened with Bendec
tin. But if this occurs, the pharmaceutical company should blame itself

25. SANDERS, supra note 24, at 62. After the Thalidomide disaster, Congress required the
Food and Drug Administration to examine for efficacy all drugs marketed prior to 1962. Because of
enormous backlogs it was not until 1975 that the FDA required Merrell to conduct additional stud
ies. Id. at 4. Now, of course a drug could not be marketed without FDA approval. But just because a
drug has passed safety and efficacy trials does not mean that it is incapable of causing problems that
cannot be detected during the clinical trials. See Berger & Twerski, supra note I, at 261.
26.

SANDERS, supra

27.

Id. at 69.

28.

Id. at 8.

note 24, at 70 ( summarizing the results in a chart).

note 11, at 128-29.

29.

GREEN, supra

30.

SANDERS, supra

31.

GREEN, supra

note 24, at 63.

note 11, at 334.
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rather than greedy lawyers-in order to show that the uncertain risks pose
no real dangers it could have done the studies that Merrell chose not to do
until litigation was well under way. Our solution will provide inducements
for pharmaceutical companies to divulge and to develop information when
problems first surface.
B. The Parlodel Saga
Professor Bernstein levels his guns at Bendectin and gives only scant at
tention to Parlodel, the second example we use to support our thesis that a
causation-free informed choice cause of action is necessary to support pa
tient autonomy. Bernstein has good reason to avoid the discussion of
Parlodel for unlike Bendectin he cannot support his attack based on scien
tific evidence that supports its proven safety. Parlodel was approved by the
FDA in 1980 for the prevention of postpartum lactation (PPL) in women
32
who could not or chose not to breast-feed. By 1985, there were enough
reports of adverse reactions to Parlodel that the FDA requested that the
manufacturer, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, warn about adverse reactions such
33
as seizures, strokes, and heart attacks. Sandoz initially resisted the request
but agreed over the years to make labeling changes and finally to notify doc
tors in writing about the potential dangers of using Parlodel for PPL.
However, throughout, Sandoz did everything it could to undermine the
warnings. First, it mailed the "Dear Doctor" letters to only a small fraction
34

of the doctors registered in the college of obstetricians and gynecologists.

Sandoz only distributed the letters to a wider audience when forced by the
35
FDA. In 1987, Sandoz issued an internal memo to its sales force explain
ing that, while it had modified the Parlodel package insert to reflect the
adverse reactions, "this issue should not be mentioned unless a discussion is
36

initiated by the physician."

In 1989, the FDA Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Com
mittee found that given the uncertain risk of serious adverse reactions,
routine use of Parlodel for PPL was unwarranted since use of common anal
37
gesics and breast support was equally if not more effective. The FDA
adopted the committee's recommendation in 1989 and asked all the manu
facturers of lactation suppression drugs to voluntarily state that these drugs

32. See Eve v. Sandoz Phann. Corp. No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at
*IO (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2001). For an extensive listing of the appellate cases dealing with Parlodel,
see Berger & Twerski, supra note 1, at 269 n.69. The Eve case contains the most comprehensive
description of the conduct of Sandoz throughout the years that the drug was used for anti-lactation
purposes.
33.

Eve, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *12-18.

34. See Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Gunderson, Nos. 2004-CA-001536-MR, 2004-CA-001537MR, 2005 WL 2694816 , at *8 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005) (as modified on denial of rehearing).
35.

Id. at *9.

36.

Eve, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4531, at *19-20.

37.

Id. at *26--27.
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38
are not indicated for PPL. All the manufacturers complied with the excep
39
tion of Sandoz. Not only did it not comply, it instructed its sales force to
40
sell Parlodel aggressively. One sales representative testified that "Parlodel
was . .. receiving a lot of heat in the journals and from the FDA and .. . we
needed to bleed every dollar that we could get out of Parlodel before the
, 41
FDA just put a stop to it.' Only when faced with FDA proceedings in 1994
to withdraw approval of Parlodel for PPL did Sandoz "voluntarily" with
42
draw the Parlodel indication for the prevention of lactation.
Plaintiffs who have suffered from the adverse reactions associated with
ingestion of Parlodel have, with rare exception, not prevailed because de
fendants have maintained successful Daubert challenges to plaintiffs ' expert
43
testimony. As noted in our earlier article, we are agnostic as to the wisdom
of Daubert and whether it is being appropriately applied. W hen a drug com
pany, however, behaves in a manner that does not adequately portray the
risks and indeed downplays them to squeeze every last dollar from the drug
44
before bowing to FDA demands, plaintiffs who would have avoided taking
the drug if informed of the potential risks and who have suffered injuries
from the very risks that they should have been warned against have a legiti
mate claim for the deprivation of informed consent. Plaintiffs deprived of
the requisite information as to whether to take a drug that has no therapeutic
benefits have a right to mental distress damages arising from the deprivation
of choice. Bernstein cannot claim that Parlodel has been proven safe for
lactation suppression. It has not. The risks are real. Sandoz continued to tell
doctors that it was useful in the teeth of clear evidence to the contrary to
, 45
protect profits from a drug that one of its salespeople dubbed a "cash cow.'

38.

Sandoz Pharm. Corp.

39.

Id.

v.

Gunderson, 2005 WL 2694816, at *9.

40.

Eve, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *27-28.

41.

Id. at *28.

42.

/d.at*ll.

43.

See Berger & Twerski, supra note I, at 269 n.69, for an extensive listing of cases.

44. The conduct of Sandoz was so egregious that the court in Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.
v. Gunderson, 2005 WL 2694816, at *13, found that it was reasonable to find that the behavior
amounted to a "wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of women" and entitled the plaintiff to
punitive damages. The court did, however, vacate the jury award of $11.25 million for punitive
damages and remanded for a new trial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that it was
not to punish Sandoz for conduct that occurred outside of Kentucky. The court affirmed jury awards
of compensatory damages of $3 million apiece to each of the decedent's children for loss of consor
tium and $1.848 million to the decedent's estate for loss of services and lost earnings. Gunderson is
a rare case that has survived challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony on the issue of
whether Parlodel causes strokes.
45.

Eve, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *28.
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'
II. BERNSTEIN S SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS

A. Informed Choice Warnings Are Not Worthless
Bernstein argues that our contention that the vast majority of patients
would refuse to take a lifestyle drug when warned that it presents uncertain
46
risks is incorrect. He claims that it depends on how the warning is articu
lated. With regard to Bendectin he admits that if pregnant women had been
told that there was an uncertain risk of birth defects then we would be cor
47
If, however, it were portrayed more accurately as "We can never

rect.

guarantee with absolute certainty that a drug will not cause birth defects, but
Bendectin has been used safely for over twenty years, the FDA and the sci
entific community believe that it is the only drug safe and effective for
treating NVP (morning sickness), and there is no reputable evidence to the
contrary" the vast majority of women would have decided to take Bendectin
48
to relieve NVP. The problem with Bernstein's proposed warning is that it
does not reflect an honest evaluation of the uncertainty during most of the
years that Bendectin was on the market. A more appropriate warning would
have read: "We have yet to do reliable testing as to whether Bendectin
causes birth defects. Not only can we not opine that it is safe, we have yet to
confirm adverse reaction reports that suggest that it may be a teratogen. Un
til further research establishes its safety, Bendectin should be used only in
cases of severe nausea." The problem with the honest warning is that Ben
dectin would not have been the huge moneymaker that it was. It would have
had a small market niche. Merrell would certainly not have sold thirty-six
million prescriptions during the twenty-seven years it was marketed. W hen
one seeks to huckster drugs as if they were M&M's, brutal honesty is called
for.
Had Merrell provided the suggested warning, Bernstein would not be
wringing his hands today that an effective and safe drug was removed from
the market thus depriving women who truly need the drug of its availability.
Bendectin was pursued by plaintiffs' lawyers for good reason. Adverse reac
tion reports, in vivo studies, and Bendectin 's chemical similarity to known
49
teratogens suggested that there might be a problem. Until litigation forced
its hand, Merrell did little to dissipate its ignorance about the drug. Plaintiffs
who blindly took it on the drug manufacturer's good faith and who should
have been given a choice to do otherwise have a legitimate right to recovery
for the distress that they suffered. Warnings about inadequate testing do not
lead us down a slippery slope to useless warnings, at least not for non
therapeutic drugs.

46.

Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1968.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

See SANDERS, supra note 24, at 4-5.
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B. Bypassing Daubert Will Not Lead
to Unreliable Expert Testimony
In our proposal we acknowledge that a causation-free informed choice
5
cause of action places heavy emphasis on defining material risk. 0 W hen a
material risk has not been warned against and the plaintiff later suffers from
the risk that should have been warned against, a cause of action for mental
distress for the denial of informed choice accrues. In deciding whether a risk
is material, we argue that a broad range of evidence may be considered.
Sources such as animal studies, chemical-structure analysis, in vitro studies,
preliminary but not yet determinative epidemiological studies, and adverse
reaction reports are all relevant as to whether a risk is material. These
sources are often excluded in Daubert screening since each alone is not de
terminative on the issue of causation and courts have been unwilling to
aggregate them to support a finding of causation. Bernstein argues that hired
gun experts and outliers who hold views far outside the mainstream of their
professions will have a field day with a cause of action that allows them to
testify as to such a broad mosaic of evidence.
We would ask Bernstein: if our proposal for risk assessment is not cor
rect, what would he propose in its stead? How is materiality of risk to be
assessed if not from the composite of all sources that, taken together, tell us
that a risk is of sufficient moment that it deserves a warning? Bernstein
would answer that a jury ought never to evaluate the composite picture of
risk. Only if each slice of evidence standing alone is sufficient to make out
causation under the strictures of Daubert will a jury ever see the panoply of
51
sources relevant to the determination of whether a risk is material. That
strikes us as manifestly unfair. A jury will rarely be privy to all the relevant
data to determine whether a warning should have been given. Bernstein's
answer seems to be to preempt the warning case on Daubert causation
grounds and no one will ever know the better of it.
Our approach is the very opposite. Let the judge and jury hear the full
story on risk assessment and causation. If the judge believes that the testi
mony in its totality does not meet Daubert standards, the judge is free to
direct a verdict on the issue of causation. Furthermore, if the judge believes
that the composite information does not meet Daubert standards as to the
existence of material risk the judge is free to direct a verdict for the defen
dant on the informed choice cause of action. But we ought not to willfully
blindfold both the judge and the jury from the evidence that supports a find
ing that a material risk was not warned against.
Finally, Bernstein ignores our view that the standard for material risk
ought not to be based on a "reasonable person standard" that is used by most
courts in determining informed consent in medical malpractice cases but

50.

Berger & Twerski, supra note I, at 275-80.

51.

Id. at 279-80.
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52

1991

Only the kind of risks that

reasonable physicians (not outliers) would want to have revealed to them so
that they can decide whether to prescribe the drug to their patients need be
warned against. Physicians live with risk on daily basis. They do not seek
information about remote risks that have no practical significance. A trial
judge utilizing the substantive "reasonable physician" standard and applying
the evidentiary Daubert standard should be able to screen out unworthy
cases that do not constitute a material risk.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS WILL NOT WORK
In his conclusion, Bernstein concedes the gravity of the problems we
seek to address-the inability of premarketing testing to ensure the safety of
a newly marketed drug, and the ineffectiveness of postmarketing surveil
53
lance. Bernstein offers no solutions. But in contrast to ours, which he terms
54
"the least attractive possible response," he praises a recent article by Pro
55
fessor Catherine Struve. One aspect of her proposal according to Bernstein
is that it "takes determination of the scientific merits of claims that a com
pany is concealing a hazard away from random panels of lay jurors and
56
gives them to scientific experts at the FDA." Although it is true that Struve
explores this option in some detail, she ends up by rejecting it. She con
cludes that "recent experience provides strong reason to question the
wisdom of giving the FDA (as currently structured and funded) and its advi
sory panels (as currently staffed) a dispositive role in products liability
57
actions."
The recent experience to which Struve alludes is undoubtedly the Vioxx
debacle which revealed an underfunded FDA, riddled by internal strife, de
void of postmarketing surveillance capacity, and subject to industry control
and political pressure. Although the FDA is exploring ways in which to re
structure itself, it is highly unlikely given current budgetary constraints,
political reality, and the clout of the pharmaceutical industry that the agency
will emerge with sufficient power and independence to become a viable
candidate for resolving postmarketing issues about drugs that it initially ap
proved. Our proposal recognizes the weaknesses of the FDA regulatory
scheme and the strength of an independent judicial system. It is not the liti
gation system that is at fault. The Vioxx episode demonstrates-as did
Bendectin and Parlodel-that current tort law does not provide adequate
incentives for pharmaceutical companies to supply physicians with enough

52.
Bernstein's concern is that juries will be duped by "outlier experts" and "hired guns"
who will make a mockery of the judicial process. Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1969.
53.

Id. at 1979.

54.

Id. at 1979--80.

55.
Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Com
pensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y, L. & ETHICS 587 (2005).
56.

Bernstein, supra note 8, at 1980.

57.

Struve, supra note 55, at 668.
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information so that they can notify their patients of the risks they run when
taking a drug that offers little or no therapeutic benefits, especially when the
58
We believe that the courts have ade

drug is producing billions in profits.

quate tools to curb irrational juries and to reduce excessive awards. W hat the
courts do not have is a rule of substantive law that will deter behavior inimi
cal to public health and that will fairly compensate victims who have not
been provided with an informed choice. It is time for tort law to respond.
CONCLUSION
Professor Bernstein has it wrong. Under the cover of Daubert he is will
ing to allow drug manufacturers blanket immunity from negligent and even
reckless failure to warn about risks that should have been brought to the
attention of patients before they decide whether they wish to imbibe non
therapeutic drugs. Daubert has become more than a hoary rule of evidence.
That it has blocked recovery for physical harms that cannot be made out
under its strict standard for the admissibility of expert testimony may be
defensible. But, that courts have not focused on the need to protect the right
of informed choice is not. Bernstein does not respond to our argument that
the right of informed choice deserves protection. His only response is to list
a parade of horribles that might eventuate if our proposal is accepted. Those
cries have accompanied every proposal for the expansion of tort law. A
cause of action allowing pure mental distress damages is not likely to run
amok. Courts have been quite willing to ride tight herd on the mental dis
tress cause of action. The specter of drug manufacturers refusing to test for
fear that information they develop may be detrimental or what is worse se
creting information that may deter patients from taking non-therapeutic
drugs cannot go unaddressed. We share some of Professor Bernstein's con
cerns but not his conclusion. He has sadly left unanswered our question as
to what happened to the right of autonomy for patients who unwittingly take
drugs that they would not have taken if presented with the uncertain risks
attendant to their use. They are doomed to live their lives with the pain and
anguish of knowing that their lives or those of their children might not have
been compromised if they had been given the choice deservedly due them.
That injury is real and warrants legal recognition.

58.
The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors became so incensed about the
failure of drug companies to furnish information about ongoing clinical trials that it announced in
September 2004 that its journals would not publish the results of any trials that had not been regis
tered in a public registry by September 13, 2005. An article recently examined compliance with this
requirement. It found that registrations by academic and governmental institutions were universally
completed in a meaningful fashion but that some commercial entities were still playing games by
not providing the names of the drug being studied or not providing details about the trial's primary
outcome as required. See Jeffrey M. Drazen & Alastair J.J. Wood, Trial Registration Report Card,
353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2809 (2005).

